Chicago Journal of International Law
Volume 8

Number 1

Article 16

6-1-2007

Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: The Yukos
Arbitration and the Future Place of Provisional Application in
International Law
Alex M. Niebruegge

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil

Recommended Citation
Niebruegge, Alex M. (2007) "Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: The Yukos Arbitration
and the Future Place of Provisional Application in International Law," Chicago Journal of International
Law: Vol. 8: No. 1, Article 16.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol8/iss1/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty:
The Yukos Arbitration and the Future Place of
Provisional Application in International Law
Alex M. Niebruegge*
The provisional application of treaties is a relatively recent development in
international treaty law designed to address some of the shortcomings of the
traditional practice of concluding treaties. Generally, the process of concluding a
treaty has taken place under a three-step process of signature, ratification, and
entry into force.' Parties to a treaty must express their consent to be bound, a
process most commonly achieved through a simple signature that expresses a
party's consent to be bound subject to domestic ratification of the treaty.
Signatories then must ratify the treaty under their respective domestic
procedures. Once the required number of signatories has ratified the treaty, the
treaty will definitively enter into force. It is only at this point that positive legal
obligations arise under the treaty.2
Prior to entry into force, a treaty does not impose positive legal duties and
obligations on signatory parties; and as a result of each state's varying process of
ratification, there is often a substantial gap in time between treaty signature and
entry into force. By contrast, provisional application imposes duties and
obligations on signatories during this gap period and can be best understood as
an attempt to solve collective action problems created by this gap. Under the
provisional application of a treaty, signatory states undertake to give effect to
treaty obligations prior to the completion of the domestic ratification
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Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a "treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (1969), art 26, 1155 UN Treaty Set 331, 339 (WCLT").

ChicagoJournalof InternafionalLaw

procedures, with the intention of acceding to the treaty once domestic
ratification has been completed.3 However, the extent to which these obligations
are binding, affirmative legal obligations has not been firmly established in
international law. This Comment will examine the obligations imposed by the
provisional application of treaties through an analysis of the Energy Charter
Treaty ("ECT") in the context of the Yukos Arbitration.
The ECT is an energy-sector specific multilateral treaty designed to
promote long-term cooperation in the energy sector. Currently, fifty-one states,
including Russia, are signatories to the ECT. One important feature of the ECT
is that it provides for the provisional application of the treaty by a signatory
pending formal domestic ratification by that signatory. As a signatory that has
not expressly indicated an inability to apply the ECT provisionally, Russia is
obligated to comply with its terms prior to ratification by the Russian State
Duma "to the extent that such provisional
application is not inconsistent with its
' 4
constitution, laws, or regulations.
Russia's agreement to apply the ECT provisionally is an important factor in
resolving the arbitration Russia is currently engaged in under the dispute
resolution provisions of the ECT ('Yukos Arbitration") with subsidiaries of
Group Menatep ("Menatep'" 5 over Russia's forced dismantlement of the Yukos
Oil Company ("Yukos"). A threshold issue in this arbitration will be whether
Russia, in agreeing to apply the ECT provisionally, incurred binding, affirmative
legal obligations that could expose it to liability for the actions taken against
Yukos.
Furthermore, the extent to which the provisional application of treaties
imposes binding, affirmative legal obligations is not an isolated question without
future significance. Recently, Russia has again presided over what appears
reminiscent of a Yukos-esque forced nationalization of the Sakhalin II liquefied
natural gas project.6 Russia also continues to indirectly threaten further
nationalization and consolidation in the energy sector. It seems probable that the
efficacy of the ECT and the obligations imposed by its provisional application
will again be put to the test.
Section I discusses the basis, use, and advantages of the provisional
application of treaties in international law. Section II will provide a general
3

UN Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Handbook at §2.4 (§3.4 in online version) (cited in note 1).

4

See The Energy Charter Treaty (1994), art 45(1), 34 ILM 360, 409 (1995) ("ECT").

5

Menatep is a holding company which held a controlling interest in Yukos before the Russian
actions discussed in Section III.
As discussed in Section V, in December 2006, after months of Russian bullying ostensibly relating
to environmental violations by the Sakhalin II project, Gazprom, the state monopoly provider of
natural gas, which is 40 percent owned by the Russian government, acquired a 50 percent-plusone-share stake in the project at below market price. See notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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overview of the ECT, with a specific emphasis on the treaty provisions likely to
arise in the Yukos Arbitration; and Section III presents a brief factual
background to the Yukos Arbitration. Section IV analyzes the Yukos Arbitration
by examining how the characterization of the obligations imposed by provisional
application under the ECT should be resolved in light of the purpose behind
provisional application of treaties. Section V will discuss how the outcome of
the Yukos Arbitration has the potential to impact foreign investment under the
ECT. The Comment concludes with a general discussion of the future place of
provisional application in international treaty law.
I. PROVISIONAL APPLICATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The process of concluding a treaty can be broken down into three distinct
phases: signature, ratification, and entry into force.' Signature of a treaty in and
of itself does not impose a legal duty on a signatory to ultimately ratify the
treaty. 8 Nor, as a general principle of international law, do treaties have legal
effect before entry into force.9 Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties ("VCLT") provides a limited exception to this principle by obliging
signatories to a treaty to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty.10 However, this obligation does not impose affirmative
duties on a state to carry out specific provisions of the treaty."
It is in the gap between signature and entry into force, and against the
backdrop of the absence of affirmative duties to carry out provisions of a treaty
prior to entry into force, that the concept of provisional application has arisen,
Article 25 of the VCLT provides that a treaty or parts of a treaty may be applied
provisionally pending entry into force if the treaty so provides or the parties
have otherwise agreed. Article 25, however, does not define the substance of
provisional application or the specific obligations provisional application
imposes. Rather, it grants negotiating parties broad discretion to fashion the
specific mode by which provisional application of the treaty at issue will
operate. 12

8

See Emmanuel Roucounas, Uncertainties Regarding the Enty into Force of Some MultilateralTreaties, in
Karel Wellens, ed, InternationalLaw: Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Eric Suy 179, 179
(Kluwer 1998).
Martin A. Rogoff, The InternationalLegal Obligationsof Signatories to an UnratifiedTreaty, 32 Me L Rev

9

263, 267 (1980).
See VCLT, arts 26, 24(1), 24(2), 28 (cited in note 2).

10

Id, art 18.

11

Rogoff, InternationalLegal Obligationsof Signatories at 297 (cited in note 8).

12

VCLT, art 25 (cited in note 2).

7
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A. USE OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The provisional application of treaties has primarily been utilized in two
types of situations. The first involves treaties responding to some form of
international crisis. In these situations, where immediate and decisive action may
be necessary to avert catastrophe, delays caused by the ratification process have
the potential to frustrate effective international response. Examples of such
treaties include the 1934 Pacte d'Entente Balkanique; the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development's response to the 1973 Arab Oil
Embargo; and the International Atomic Energy Agency's response to the
Chernobyl nuclear incident.' 3 The second situation involves treaties for which
rapid, broad-based participation and implementation is essential to ensure the
effectiveness of the treaty regime. Examples within this category include arms
control treaties such as the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, 4 the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of
Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,' 5 and, most
notably for the purposes of this Comment, the Protocol of Provisional
Application16 ("PPA") of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
("4GATT"3).

The GATT was originally developed as a means of providing an
accelerated process for reducing tariffs and other trade barriers while negotiation
of the broader treaty regime of the International Trade Organization ("ITO")
was ongoing. 17 In October 1947, the eight primary negotiating states, including
the US, each agreed t6 provisionally apply the GATT to the extent that the
18
GATT provisions were not inconsistent with their nation's existing legislation.
This provisional application was intended to be a stopgap measure until the ITO
became established; however, the ITO effectively failed as a viable treaty regime
when the US Senate blocked US ratification. With the death of the ITO,
provisional application of the GATT regime under the PPA governed
13

14
15

16
17

18

Rene Lefeber, The ProvisionalApplicationof Treaties, in Jan Klabbers and Rene Lefeber, eds, Essays on
the Law of Treaties: A Collection of Essays in Honour of Bert Vierdag 81, 82-83 (Kluwer 1998) (listing
examples of treaties including a provisional application term).
See Andrew Michie, The ProvisionalApplication of Arms Control Treaties, 10 J Conflict & Sec L 345
(2005).
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (1982), 33 ILM 1309 (1994).
Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), 61
Stat A2051, 55 UN Treaty Set 308 (1950).
See David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization:
Practice and Procedure3 (Kluwer 1999).

Id.
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international trade relations for the forty-seven years until the GATT was
replaced by the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in 1994. The success of the
PPA illustrates the potential that the provisional application of treaties has in
creating stable international trade and investment regimes.
B. ADVANTAGES OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
Provisional application can be best understood as an attempt to solve the
collective action problem created by the gap between signature and entry into
force of an international treaty. Particularly within the context of international
trade and investment treaties, the rapid, uniform, and broad-based
implementation of treaty protections and obligations is crucial to the efficacy of
the treaty regime. However, given the gap between signature and entry into force
and the lack of a ratification obligation in international law, the prospect of
capturing some of the benefits of the treaty regime at the time of signing without
incurring the costs of treaty obligations that come with ratification creates an
incentive for a signatory to defect from the treaty regime by delaying or failing to
ratify the treaty. Provisional application helps to minimize this defection
problem by forcing signatory parties to bear the costs of treaty obligations
immediately at the time of signing. Signatories are induced to take on these
obligations by gaining the ability to capture the full benefits of the treaty regime
rather than only being able to capture the indirect benefits available to parties for
whom the treaty has not entered into force.19

II. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY
The ECT, an energy-sector specific multilateral investment treaty, was
signed in December 1994 and entered into force in April 1998. The declared
purpose of the ECT is to "establish[ ] a legal framework ...to promote longterm cooperation in the energy field.., in accordance with the objectives and
principles of the [European Energy] Charter. ' 20 Aiming to "strengthen the rule
of law on energy issues, by creating a level playing field of rules to be observed
by all participating governments, thereby mitigating risks associated with energy-

19
20

In the context of the ECT, an example of such an indirect benefit would be the benefit accruing
to a non-ratifying state's economy from the establishment of a more stable global energy market.
ECT, art 2 (cited in note 4). The European Energy Charter is a nonbinding declaration of political
intent to promote East-West cooperation in the energy sector following the collapse of the USSR.
It was signed by over fifty states in December 1991. See Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy
Charter Treay: A Reader's Guide, 8 (2002), available online at <http://www.encharter.org/
fileadmin/user-upload/document/documentl158668628.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007) ("Reader's
Guide").
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related investments and trade, ' 21 the ECT seeks to unite signatories behind the
common goals of establishing open energy markets, securing and diversifying
energy supply, and stimulating cross-border investment and trade in the energy
sector.2 ' To this end, the ECT encompasses a broad range of energy-related
issues, including, inter alia, investment, trade, and transit of energy goods;
however, for purposes of this Comment, only a limited number of provisions
need be addressed. 23 This Section will provide a general overview of the
provisions of primary importance in the Yukos Arbitration-those concerning
provisional application, investment promotion and protection, and dispute
settlement.
A.

PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Article 45(1) of the ECT expressly provides that "[e]ach signatory agrees to
apply this Treaty provisionally pending its entry into force for such signatory...
to the extent that such provisional application is not inconsistent with [the
signatory's] constitution, laws or regulations. 2 4 Article 45(2) provides that,
notwithstanding Article 45(1), a signatory may declare when signing that it is
unable to accept provisional application. By virtue of exercising this opt-out
right, a signatory and its investors are barred from claiming the benefits of
provisional application of the ECT.25 As of July 2006, five signatoriesAustralia, Belarus, Iceland, Norway, and the Russian Federation-have not
ratified the ECT.2 6 Of these, Australia, Iceland, and Norway have chosen to
formally exercise the opt-out provision.27
Article 45(3) provides that a signatory may at any time terminate its
provisional application by written notification of its intention not to become a
Contracting Party ("CP") to the treaty. However, the provisions of Part III of
the ECT, concerning investment promotion and protection, and Part V,
concerning dispute settlement, continue to apply to investments made during

23

Energy Charter Secretariat, Energy Charter: About the Charter, available online at <http://
www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
Energy Charter Secretariat, Reader's Guide at 9 (cited in note 20).
For a general discussion of the ECT as a whole, see Craig S.Bamberger, An Overview of the Energy

24

Charter Treaty, in Thomas W. Wilde, ed, The Ener
Investment & Trade 1, 1-34 (Kiuwer 1996).
ECT, art 45(1) (cited in note 4).

25

Id, art 45(2).

26

Energy Charter Secretariat, Enegy Charter: FAQ, available online at <http://www.encharter.org/
index.php?id= 18> (visited Apr 21, 2007).

27

Id.

21

22

Charter Treay: An East-West Gateway for
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the period of provisional application for twenty years from the date of
termination.28
B. INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
The scope of investment protection under the ECT is broad. Article 1(6)
defines "investment" to mean "every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly
or indirectly by an [i]nvestor" that is associated with an "Economic Activity in
the Energy Sector., 29 Within this broad scope, the ECT aims to "reduc[e] to a
minimum the non-commercial
risks associated
with energy-sector
investments," 3 ° by requiring CPs to "encourage and create stable, equitable,
favourable and transparent conditions" for investors. 3 ' These conditions include
a commitment to provide the existing investments of investors from other CPs
fair and equitable treatment.3 2 The ECT also provides that such investments
shall "enjoy the most constant protection and security," and that "no
Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory
measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal."33
Furthermore, Article 10(7) provides that CPs shall accord investments and
related activities the better of national treatment or most-favored nation
treatment.
Article 13 of the ECT addresses the issue of expropriation, providing that
"investments... shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a
measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or
expropriation" except where the expropriation or measure equivalent is "(a) for
a purpose which is in the public interest; (b) not discriminatory; (c) carried out
under due process of law; and (d) accompanied by the payment of prompt,
34
adequate and effective compensation.,

33

ECT, art 45(3)(b) (cited in note 4).
Id, art 1(6).
Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents 14 (2004), available
online at <http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user-upload/document/EN.pdf> (visited Apr
21, 2007) ("ECT& RelatedDocuments)
ECT, art 10(1) (cited in note 4).
Id. Article 10 expressly distinguishes between existing investments, which are protected by the
ECT, and activities in the pre-investment or making of investment phase, which are not protected
and are to be governed by a supplemental agreement that has not yet been negotiated. See
Chairman'sStatement at Adoption Session on 17 December 1994, ECT & Related Documents at 157 (cited
in note 30).
ECT, art 10(1) (cited in note 4).

34

Id, art 13(l).

28
29
30

31
32
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C. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

Part V of the ECT adopts a bifurcated approach to dispute settlement.
Article 26 provides for investor-state arbitration for investment disputes
"between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party
relating to.. . an alleged breach of an obligation of the former under Part III" of
the ECT.35 Article 27 provides that all other disputes, except for those relating
to competition under Article 6 and environmental aspects under Article 19, shall
be settled in state-state arbitration. However, for purposes of this Comment,
only the investor-state arbitration provisions of Article 26 are relevant.
Under the investor-state arbitration provisions, parties are first encouraged
to settle any disputes amicably.3 6 If a dispute cannot be settled within a period of
three months, the investor party has the option to submit the dispute to the
courts of the host state,3 7 to any previously-agreed-upon dispute settlement
procedure, or to an international arbitral tribunal.38 The ECT requires that both
the host state and the investor give their unconditional consent to the
submission of a dispute to international arbitration.39 Investors choosing to
submit the dispute to an international arbitral tribunal may submit the dispute to
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,4 ° an ad hoc
arbitration tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), or an
arbitral proceeding under the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce.4 1
III. THE YUKOS DISPUTE
Yukos is a publicly-traded joint stock corporation organized under the laws
of the Russian Federation in 1993 as part of the privatization and consolidation
35

Id, art 26(1).

36

Id.

37

It should be noted that the use of the term "Contracting Party" in Article 26(1) would appear to
exclude disputes between investors and signatories who have agreed to apply the ECT
provisionally. As discussed in Section IV.A, this reading does not comport with the purpose of
the ECT nor with other provisions of the ECT. Accordingly, for the purposes of clarity within
this Section, I shall use the term "host state" rather than "Contracting Party."
ECT, arts 26(2), (3) (cited in note 4).

38
39

40

41

Article 26(3) provides that each host state gives its unconditional consent to the submission of
disputes, and Article 26(4) provides that an investor seeking to submit a dispute for resolution
under Article 26(2)(c) must provide written consent to submission. Id, arts 26(3)(a), (4).
This option is only available to disputes in which both the Host State and the state of the investor
are parties to the Washington Convention. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965), 17 UST 1270.
ECT, art 26(4) (cited in note 4).
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of state-owned energy assets following the collapse of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.42 The Russian government initially retained all shares in the
privatized Yukos; however, in response to lackluster performance and mounting
debt, it sold off its stake in the company through a series of auctions in 1995 and
1996. 4 ' The principal purchaser was a group of investors led by Mikhail
Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev through their Gibraltar-based holding
company, Menatep. 4 Prior to the Russian actions discussed in the remainder of
this section, Menatep and its subsidiaries held approximately 51 percent of
Yukos' equity capital.45
In July 2003, Mr. Lebedev, the president of Menatep, was arrested by
Russian police on charges of having illegally acquired a stake in a state-owned
fertilizer company, Apatia, in 1994.46 Over the next month, Russian authorities
arrested a number of former and current employees of Menatep, Yukos, and
other related companies. On October 25, 2003, Mr. Khodorkovsky was arrested
on charges of fraud and tax evasion, charges widely believed to have been
motivated by Mr. Khodorkovsky's support of Russian President Vladimir
Putin's political opponents and the Russian government's fear that Menatep was
going to sell a significant share of its Yukos holding to Exxon Mobil.47
Beginning in December 2003, the Russian Ministry of Finance began
making a series of tax assessments against Yukos, ultimately totaling $27.5
billion, for allegedly substantial tax underpayments for the years 2000-2004. 48
Concomitantly, in response to a request from the Russian Tax Ministry, a
See Yukos: About Us, available online at <http://www.yukos.com/Aboutus/History.asp>
(visited Apt 21, 2007).
43
Id.
44 Taming the Robber Barons, Economist 5 (May 22, 2004) (indicating that in exchange for supporting
Boris Yeltsin, Mr. Khodorkovsky was permitted to purchase control of Yukos in 1995).
45 Democray on the Retreat in Russia: Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 109th Cong,
1st Sess 2 (2005) (statement of Mr. Tim Osborne, Member Of The Board Of Directors Group
Menatep),
available
online
at
<http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/testimony/2005/
OsborneTestimony050217.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007) ("Osborne Statement").
46 Ed Caesar, The Visit: Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Life Inside, The Independent (London) 1 (Sept 15,
42

47

48

2006).
Catherine Belton, The Arrest That Proved a Turning Point, Moscow Times 1 (Oct 25, 2006)
(indicating that "Khodorkovsky's arrest came three weeks after he signed a protocol of
understanding with ExxonMobil [sic] to sell a significant chunk of his shares in Yukos"). See also
Timothy L. O'Brien, The Capitalistin the Cage, NY Times C1 Oune 20, 2004) (indicating that "Mr.
Khodorkovsky tried to sell a large stake in Yukos to an American company, Exxon Mobil,
without consulting the Kremlin").
In re Yukos Oil Co, 321 Bankr 396, 401 (Bankr SD Tex 2005) ("Yukos II). To understand the
scope of these assessments, the 2001 and 2002 assessments exceeded 100 percent of Yukos'
annual consolidated gross revenue for those years, and the 2003 assessment was in excess of 80
percent. See Plaintiff's Original Complaint for Injunctive Relief, 2004 WL 3219796, *6 (from In re

Yukos Oil Co, 320 Bankr 130 (Bankr SD Tex 2004)) ("Plaintiff's Original Complaint").
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Moscow arbitration court implemented a ban on the sale and transfer of Yukos'
assets.4 9 As a result of the asset freeze, and despite the fact that half of Yukos'
revenues were being applied to tax assessments, Yukos proved unable to satisfy
the assessments.5 0 Accordingly, in November 2004, the Russian tax authorities
announced that 76.79 percent of Yuganskneftegas ("YNG"), the wholly-owned
primary production arm of Yukos,5 ' would be auctioned on December 19, 2004
to help satisfy the back-tax liability. 2 It was widely expected that Gazprom, the
state monopoly provider of natural gas, which is 40 percent owned by the
Russian government, 3 would acquire YNG.
In response to this announcement, Yukos filed a voluntary bankruptcy
petition in the Southern District of Texas on December 14, declaring debts of
$30 billion, including the $27.5 billion tax assessments, against total assets of $12
billion, and seeking a temporary restraining order ("TRO") against the forced
sale. 4 On December 16, the bankruptcy court issued a TRO enjoining all named
defendants-including Gazprom, Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, and JP
Morgan-with the exception of the Russian government, from participating in
the auction. 5 While the bankruptcy petition was eventually dismissed in
February 2005 on jurisdictional grounds, 6 the TRO did have the immediate
effect of frightening Gazprom's Western financial backers into withdrawing
financing, 7 thereby preventing Gazprom from directly participating in the
auction. 8
A day after the issuance of the TRO, the Baikal Finans Group ("Baikal"), a
previously unknown entity, applied to participate in the auction.5 9 The auction
took place as planned on December 19 with only two participants-Baikal and
Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company. After a brief ten minute auction in
which Rosneft failed to make any bid, Baikal acquired 76.79 percent of YNG for
49

Plaintiffs Original Complaint at *6 (cited in note 48).

50

52

See Yukos II, 321 Bankr at 401.
YNG was responsible for approximately 60 percent of Yukos' crude oil production. See Erin E.
Arvedlund, Russia to Sell Big Yukos Unit at Low-End Price, NY Times W1 (Oct 13, 2004).
Erin E. Arvedlund, Russia Moves to Auction CrucialUnit ofYukos, NY Times C1 (Nov 20, 2004).

53

In re Yukos Oil Co, 320 Bankr 130, 136 (Bankr SD Tex 2004) ("Yukos 1".

54

See Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Yukos Bankyuptiy News, Issue 1 (Dec 16, 2004), available online
at <http://bankrupt.com/yukos.txt> (visited Apr 21, 2007).

55

Yukos 1, 320 Bankr at 138.

56

See Yukos 11, 321 Bankr at 411.

57

See Erin E. Arvedlund, Banks Drop Support of Bidfor Russian Oil Giant' Unit, NY Times A10 (Dec
18, 2004).
Erin E. Arvedlund and Jad Mouawad, Yukos Sale Deepens Investor Doubts, NY Times C8 (Dec 21,

s

58

2004).
59

Id.
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$9.35 billion.6 ° YNG, as a whole, had recently been valued by the investment
banks of Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein and JP Morgan as having a fair range
of equity value between $14.7 billion and $21.1 billion. 6 Three days after
acquiring YNG, Baikal was in turn acquired by Rosneft for an undisclosed
sum. 62
At the time of the auction, it was widely expected that Rosneft was to be
merged with Gazprom.63 While the merger was ultimately cancelled in May
2005,64 in its stead the Russian government created a complex transaction
between Rosneft and Gazprom that ultimately resulted in giving the Russian
government direct majority control over both Gazprom and YNG.65 Since
having been acquired by Rosneft, YNG has benefited from the substantial
reduction of at least $3.9 billion of the tax claims against it.66 These events
strengthen the perception that the actions against Yukos were not an issue of
legitimate tax liability, but rather part of a plan by the Russian government to
consolidate control over the energy sector.
IV. YUKOS ARBITRATION
On November 2, 2004, two subsidiaries of Menatep-Hulley Enterprises
Ltd and Yukos Universal Ltd (collectively "Menatep Subsidiaries")-sent notice
to Russia, beginning the three-month conciliation period required by Article
26(3) of the ECT.67 On February 3, 2005, after the expiration of the conciliation
period, the Menatep Subsidiaries filed notice of arbitration with Russia, seeking

60
61
62
63
64
65

66
67

Erin E. Arvedlund and Steven Lee Meyers, An All-but-Unknown Company Wins a Rich Russian Oil
Stake, NY Times Al (Dec 20, 2004).
Yukos 1,320 Bankr at 136.
See Erin E. Arvedlund and Simon Romero, State Company Buys Winner in Yukos Deal, NY Times
Cl (Dec 23, 2004).
Bloomberg News, Rosneft Takes Control of Yukos Oil Unit, NY Times C2 (Jan 1, 2005).
Russia Cancels Gazprom, Rosneft Merger, 103 Oil & Gas J 20, 36 (May 23, 2005).
In a simplified form, the transaction worked as follows. First, Rosneft borrowed $7.5 billion from
Western banks to increase its stake in Gazprom. This increased stake functioned to give the
Russian government direct majority control of Gazprom. Then in July 2005, Rosneft raised $10.4
billion in an initial public offering, the proceeds of which were used to repay the $7.5 billion loan.
See Andrew E. Kramer, Russian Oil Giant Raises $10.4 Billion in Offerin, NY Times C4 (July 15,
2006); Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Fattens Up a State Oil Copany, NY Times C7 (June 8, 2006).
Going Twice, Economist 57 (May 27, 2006).
Andrew Jack and Pavi Munter, Investors Bring in the Lauyers as Tax Debts FloorYukos, Fin Times 21
(Nov 4, 2004). See also Group Menatep Seeks 28.3 BLN Compensationfrom Russia, Eurasian Bus Rep
(Feb 14, 2005); Michael D. Goldhaber, Global Lanyer Strategic Arbiration, Am Lawyer (June 1,
2005),
available
online
at
<http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleFriendlyTAL.jsp?
id=1117098312615> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
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$28.3 billion in compensation for the actions against Yukos.6 8 The arbitration is
currently proceeding under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules under supervision of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.6 9 The arbitral tribunal consists
of the Russian appointee Stephen Schwebel, the Menatep Subsidiaries' appointee
Daniel Price, and the presiding arbitrator L. Yves Fortier, jointly chosen by the
parties in accordance with Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Rules. 70 It has been
reported that hearings on jurisdiction and admissibility have been set for June
2007.71
The primary claim of the Menatep Subsidiaries is that Russia's actions
against Yukos, particularly the forced sale of YNG, amounted to an
expropriation for which the Menatep Subsidiaries must be adequately
compensated. 72 Despite Russia's attempts to characterize the actions behind the
veil of the satisfaction of tax liability, given the manner in which the auction of
YNG occurred, the Menatep Subsidiaries would appear to have a strong
argument that the actions amounted to a "measure[ ] having effect equivalent to
nationalization or expropriation," in violation of Article 13 of the ECT.73
However, before reaching the merits of this claim, the tribunal must first address
two threshold jurisdictional issues.
A. PROVISIONAL APPLICATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
UNDER ARTICLE 26
The initial jurisdictional issue relates to an apparent inconsistency in the
wording of the investor-state arbitration provisions of Article 26 of the ECT.
Article 26(1) states that it applies to "[d]isputes between a ContractingPary and an
Investor of another Contracting Party., 7 4 Article 1(2) defines "Contracting
Party" as a "state ... which has consented to be bound by [the] Treaty and for
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which the Treaty is in force." 75 Provisional application by a signatory, as
provided in Article 45, expressly applies in the period before the ECT has
entered into force pursuant to the provisions of Article 44.76 Accordingly, such a
signatory would not fall within the definition of a "Contracting Party."
Therefore, solely on the basis of a literal reading, Article 26(1) would appear not
to apply to disputes between an investor and a signatory who has agreed to apply
the ECT provisionally.
Article 31 of the VCLT provides that a treaty is to be interpreted by the
ordinary meaning of its terms in context and in light of the treaty's object and
purpose." Looking to the context, such a reading conflicts with the language of
Article 45(3)(b). Article 45(3)(b) indicates that if a signatory who has agreed to
apply the ECT provisionally decides to terminate the provisional application, the
obligations of that signatory under Part 111, concerning investment protection,
and Part V, concerning dispute settlement, continue to apply for a period of
twenty years. If Article 26, an article under Part V, was not intended to apply to
signatories who have agreed to apply the ECT provisionally, the inclusion of the
language regarding the continuation of obligations under Part V would seem to
be superfluous.
Moreover, looking to the purpose of the ECT suggests that the term
"Contracting Party" in the context of Article 26(1) should be interpreted to
include signatories who have agreed to provisionally apply the ECT but for
whom the treaty has not entered into force. As discussed previously, one of the
primary goals of the ECT is to mitigate the risk associated with energy-related
investments. Without the obligations imposed by the dispute settlement
procedures, investors have limited recourse against states violating the treaty
guarantees of investment promotion and protection under Part III. The twentyyear continuation period provided by Article 45(3)(b) works to mitigate the risk
of this limited legal recourse by ensuring the availability of appropriate fora for
dispute resolution. Failing this protection, signatories who have agreed to
provisionally apply the ECT would generally be able to escape their treaty
obligations by failing to ratify the ECT, while at the same time retaining the
benefits of the ECT accrued in the period of provisional application. Such a
result would be inconsistent with the principles of reciprocity embodied in the
ECT.
Hence, a proper reading of the scope of the investor-state arbitration
provision of Article 26 should include disputes between investors and
signatories who have agreed to apply the ECT provisionally. Such a reading has
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been supported by the decision on jurisdiction in the case of Plama Consortium
Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, to date one of the few ECT arbitrations to have
issued an award."8 In Plama, the tribunal found that Article 26 of the ECT
provisionally applied from the date of a state's signature unless that state had
declared itself unable to accept provisional application under Article 45(2)(a).79
Under this proper reading, the dispute between Russia and the Menatep
Subsidiaries is within the scope of the investor-state arbitration provisions of the
ECT.
B. THE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED BY
PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
The more significant jurisdictional issue relates to the extent to which
Russia's obligations under provisional application of the ECT are binding,
affirmative, and meaningful, and therefore implicated in the present arbitration.
Article 45(1) of the ECT provides that each signatory agrees to apply the ECT
provisionally pending its ratification "to the extent that such provisional
application is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulations." 80 There
is a measure of ambiguity in the language of Article 45(1) in that it is not clear
whether the inconsistency requirement refers to the specific obligations imposed
by the ECT or to the entire concept of provisional application. Under the first
reading, the effect of Article 45(1) would be to subject each ECT provision to a
comparison against the signatory's constitution, laws, and regulations, adjudging
enforceable only those specific provisions which are not in direct conflict. Under
the second reading, the effect of Article 45(1) would be to determine if the
concept of provisional application-the ability of the executive to incur legal
obligations without legislative ratification-is inconsistent with a signatory's
constitution, laws, or regulations.
As discussed previously, Article 31 of the VCLT provides that a treaty is to
be interpreted by the ordinary meaning of its terms in context and in light of the
treaty's object and purpose.8 ' Thus, having determined that the ordinary
meaning of the terms of Article 45(1) is ambiguous, the next step is an
examination of the context of Article 45(1). Article 45(2) provides that at the
time of signing, a signatory may make "a declaration that it is not able to accept
provisional application." Article 45(2) does not allow a signatory to declare
78
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specific provisions that it is unable to accept. Rather it treats provisional
application as a singular concept, a take-it-or-leave-it approach suggested by the
second reading as opposed to the pick-and-choose approach suggested by the
first reading. An examination of Article 45(1) in the context of Article 45(2)
strongly suggests that the second reading of Article 45(1) is correct. Accordingly,
the tribunal must determine if the concept of provisional application is
inconsistent with Russia's constitution, laws, or regulations.
1. Constitutional Inconsistency with Provisional Application
One commentator has argued that in countries lacking a specific
constitutional provision explicitly providing that provisional application is
permitted, an attempt to provisionally apply a treaty would only be valid if the
constitutional procedures actually required to ratify a treaty had been satisfied
with respect to the treaty being provisionally applied.8 2 However, such an
interpretation stands at odds with the object and purpose of including a
provisional application term in the ECT, reducing it to a mere formality included
specifically to apply to those limited number of states that have specific
constitutional provisions providing for provisional application. 3 Therefore, the
correct analysis should not focus on whether Russia's constitution explicitly
permits provisional application, but rather on whether the concept of
provisional application is in direct conflict with Russia's constitution.
While a thorough analysis of Russian constitutional law is beyond the
scope of this Comment, a basic presentation of some of the issues likely to be
addressed in determining if there is a direct conflict is appropriate. Article 46(1)
of the VCLT provides that a state may not "invoke the fact that its consent to be
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal
law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless
that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of
fundamental importance."" Itcan be assumed that any question relating to the
separation of powers as established by the Russian constitution qualifies as an
internal law of fundamental importance. Therefore, the primary question is
whether the concept of provisional application amounts to a manifest violation
of the Russian constitution.
Under the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation ("1993
Constitution"), the power to negotiate and conclude treaties rests with the
82
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executive.8" This power is, however, limited by certain legislative and judicial
oversight.86 Importantly, Article 15(4) of the 1993 Constitution provides that
"[i]f other rules have been established by an international treaty of the Russian
Federation than provided for by a law [of the Russian Federation], the rules of
the international treaty shall apply."8 7 This would suggest that provisional
application established by the ECT would prevail over inconsistent Russian law.
This position is further reinforced by the Chairman's Statement at the Adoptive
Session of the Energy Charter Treaty, in which the representative of Norway,
supported by other representatives including the Russian Federation, declared
that "a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification
for its failure to perform a treaty."88 Taken together, this would seem to suggest
that the concept of provisional application does not amount to a manifest
violation of the Russian constitution; therefore, under Article 46(1) of the
VCLT, Russia would be unable to escape the ECT obligations.
2. Obligations by Estoppel
Even if a more thorough analysis of Russian constitutional law suggests
that the concept of provisional application amounts to a manifest violation of
the Russian constitution, Russia should still not be permitted to escape its ECT
obligations. As one commentator has aptly stated, "domestic limitations to the
provisional application... mean first and foremost that the competent organ
should abstain from expressing its consent to be bound to an agreement on
provisional application," and that "[i]f it does not, it will either have to comply
' 89
with the treaty or have to face its liability for an internationally wrongful act."
Russia, by becoming a signatory and failing to declare that it was unable to
accept provisional application, indicated a desire to capture the benefits of the
ECT in the period before ratification. Russia was intimately involved with all
stages of negotiation of the ECT and, as late as 2002, declared that it "views the
Energy Charter as an important instrument of international energy co-operation
and reiterates its resolve to continue its participation in the discussions within
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the framework of the Energy Charter process of a wide range of issues related to
energy transit, trade, investments and energy efficiency."9 °
It is only recently that Russia has begun to forcefully reject international
pressure to ratify the ECT, a position reiterated by Russian President Putin at a
September 2006 meeting of the G-8 summit. 9' However, at the same time,
Gazprom-and by extension the Russian government-continues to push for
greater access to Western European markets and distribution networks. 92 The
International Court of Justice has held that "[o]ne of the fundamental principles
governing [an] international relationship [established by treaty] is that a party
which disowns or does not fulfill its own obligations cannot be recognized as
retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the relationship." 93 Russia
should not be permitted both to have its cake and eat it too, and the Yukos
tribunal should accordingly find that the ECT imposes positive legal obligations
on Russia during its period of provisional application.
C. MERITS OF THE MENATEP SUBSIDIARIES' CLAIMS
The information necessary to fully examine the merits of the Menatep
Subsidiaries' claims is not publicly available, and an actual analysis of the merits
of the specific claims is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, it seems
relatively clear that provisional application is not inconsistent with the Russian
constitution; nor should Russia be permitted to claim constitutional issues as a
jurisdictional barrier to avoid a hearing on the merits in the Yukos Arbitration.
Accordingly, the tribunal should find that Russia incurred affirmative, binding
pre-ratification obligations in agreeing to accept provisional application of the
ECT, and the arbitration should proceed on the merits. The importance of such
a holding is further reinforced by the potential future implications of the Yukos
Arbitration as discussed in the following section.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE YUKOS ARBITRATION ON
THE ECT
In theory, an award or decision in the Yukos Arbitration would not hold
precedential value. The Statute of the International Court of Justice does not
90
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expressly enumerate private arbitral decisions as a recognized source of
international law.94 Furthermore, Article 32(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules expressly denies an award precedential value by only providing that an
award is "binding on the parties."9 Other international arbitral and treaty
regimes include similar non-precedential provisions.96 However, in practice,
arbitral awards tend to be regarded as a form of soft precedent.9" Thus, the
outcome of the Yukos Arbitration has the potential to directly impact not only
future arbitration under the ECT but, more broadly, the status, characterization,
and obligations imposed by provisional application in international law.
Russia continues to consolidate its hold over the energy sector.98 This was
recently forcefully reiterated by the events surrounding the Sakhalin II project.
The Sakhalin II project involves the development of gas fields off of Sakhalin
Island and the construction of a liquefied natural gas plant and associated export
facilities. Up until December 21, 2006, the project was managed by Sakhalin
Energy Investment Company Ltd ("Sakhalin Energy"), a consortium of Royal
Dutch Shell ("Shell"), Mitsui & Co, and Mitsubishi Corporation.99 Under the
Sakhalin II Production Sharing Agreement, Sakhalin Energy was only required
to pay minimal royalties on revenues until it recovered its costs. Original cost
estimates for the project were $9.9 billion. 0
In 2005, under Russian government pressure, Shell agreed to exchange a 25
percent-plus-one-share in Sakhalin Energy to Gazprom for a 50 percent stake in
another Siberian oilfield.' However, almost immediately after agreeing to the
exchange with Gazprom, Shell announced an increase in the project budget to
$21.9 billion. 10 2 This in turn set off an investigation by the Russian Ministry of
Natural Resources into the project's documentation and environmental issues,103
and resulted in the Gazprom deal stalling.
On September 26, 2006, Yury Trutnev, Russia's Minister of Natural
Resources, announced that Sakhalin Energy had one month to address
94
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environmental violations before Russian authorities would halt the work on the
Sakhalin II project.1 4 Mr. Trutnev subsequently backpedaled from this assertion,
stating that this merely indicated that an investigation into environmental
compliance had begun, not that Russia intended to revoke the operating license
of the Sakhalin 1Iproject.'0 5 On October 26, the Natural Resources Ministry
announced it had extended the environmental review by another month and
06
threatened to bring criminal charges for damaging the country's forests.1
Despite avowed statements by President Putin that these changes did not
amount to a change in the rules of foreign investment in Russia,' °7 when viewed
in the context of Russia's desire to consolidate control of the energy sector, this
seems to be a harbinger of another Yukos-esque expropriation.
As widely expected, on December 21, under an increasingly ominous cloud
of investigative delays, Shell and its partners agreed to sell Gazprom a 50 percent
plus 1 share of the project for $7.45 billion, 1°8 a price viewed by some analysts as
below market value. 109 The same evening as the deal was announced, President
Putin stated that the "project's 'fundamental problems'--cost overruns and
environmental
violations-'can
be
considered resolved.''"
Further
underscoring the non-market character of the transaction, on December 28 the
Russian government announced that Shell and its partners had given up the right
to recoup $3.6 billion in capital expenses on a priority basis, money that they
were to receive before the Russian government began collecting substantial
royalties."'
As a specific term of the sale, it is highly probable that Shell and its
partners have waived any claims under the ECT. However, similar bullying
continues to develop with regard to other energy projects controlled by foreign
investors, notably the Arctic Kharyaga oil and gas field being developed by
France's Total and Norway's Hydro. The Russian government is currently in the
process of reviewing the license to the field, and has indicated that it is seeking a
Russian investor for the project." 2 A similar process is occurring with respect to
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the Kovykta gas development in East Siberia being developed by the TNK-BP
joint venture." 3
If these developments play out as suggested by the outcome of the Yukos
and Sakhalin II affairs, and if any of the foreign investors do bring claims under
the ECT, arbitration would once again hinge on the status of Russia's
provisional application of the ECT. Given the soft precedential value of arbitral
decisions, there is a need to send a clear message in the Yukos Arbitration that
Russia's provisional application imposes meaningful binding and affirmative
obligations that will expose Russia to liability for any expropriatory actions in
violation of the ECT.
VI. CONCLUSION
As discussed in Section I.B, provisional application helps to minimize the
collective action problem caused by the gap between signature and entry into
force of a treaty by forcing signatory parties to bear the costs of treaty
obligations from the moment of signature. However, as illustrated by the Yukos
dispute, there is a danger that in certain circumstances, provisional application
may actually increase the defection risk. This can only result if the obligations
imposed by provisional application are not characterized as binding and
affirmative, or are held to be limited in scope. Under these conditions, a
signatory agreeing to provisional application would be able to capture the full
benefits of the treaty regime up until the point that the signatory determines that
the costs of complying in a particular case are less than the benefits to be gained
from defection, escaping liability on the grounds that provisional application did
not impose binding obligations.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the vagueness of the obligations
imposed by provisional application is the primary strength of the concept of
provisional application. This vagueness may allow a state to join a treaty regime
without initially encountering constitutional or political problems at the national
level and without suffering negative reputational effects in the international
community arising from refusal to become a signatory. Thus, assuming that the
costs to a state's international reputation from failing to follow through with
obligations imposed by the treaty it is provisionally applying are sufficiently high,
the outcome in the vast majority of cases will be for a state to follow through
with its obligations. As a result, the overall effect may be efficient. However, this
argument is susceptible to two primary weaknesses. First, in practice, the costs
of choosing to violate obligations imposed by a treaty that is being provisionally
applied may not be sufficiently high so as to prevent the majority of defects. The
113
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case of Russia following its actions against Yukos is illustrative of this point.
Even in the face of increasing doubts about the commitment of the Russian
government to protect foreign investment, such investment nonetheless
increased by 42 percent in the first half of 2006."' It seems that some markets
are so large that foreign investors cannot afford to ignore them despite the risks
attendant to such foreign investment. The second weakness relates to the fact
that awards by international tribunals are in practice treated as a form of soft
precedent. Hence, ex ante, before an international tribunal has directly addressed
the extent to which provisional application imposes obligations, the argument
regarding the benefits of vagueness may hold true. However, an award in Yukos
Arbitration directly assessing the issue of provisional application would in
practice be treated as the default rule, thereby eliminating any benefits vagueness
may have previously provided.
Regardless of the ultimate outcome on the merits of the Yukos Arbitration,
a holding by the tribunal in the Yukos Arbitration establishing affirmative,
meaningful, and legally binding obligations arising from the provisional
application of treaties has the potential to strengthen the future role of
provisional application in international treaty law. Provisional application has the
potential to be particularly useful in the context of a global multilateral
investment treaty. Even as the WTO was coming into being in 1995, OECD
began negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, a global treaty
on foreign investment. While this effort ultimately failed by 1998, largely as a
result of claims that OECD was not the proper forum for negotiating a global
treaty on foreign investment, 115 it does highlight the perceived need to develop
such a broad-based treaty. In November 2001, the WTO agreed to include the
subject of foreign investment in the next round of trade talks, though this is
unlikely to result in any immediate action." 6 Thus, while the prospects for a
global multilateral investment treaty in the near future remain dim, it seems clear
that the importance of multilateral cooperation in investment will only continue
to increase as developing countries seek out foreign investment and foreign
investors search for new markets in which their investments are adequately
protected. Given the large number of participating states, any attempt to
establish a global multilateral treaty on investment would inherently create
substantial collective action problems. Providing for the provisional application
of such a treaty has the potential to minimize the collective action problems that
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result from the gap between signature and entry into force by forcing states to
internalize the costs of defection from a treaty that they are provisionally
applying. However, as illustrated by the Yukos Arbitration, these beneficial
effects will only arise if provisional application creates binding, affirmative legal
obligations during the period of provisional application.
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